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ABSTRACT
The increasingly pervasive connectivity of today’s information sys-
tems brings up new challenges to security. Traditional security has
accomplished a long way toward protecting well-defined goals such
as confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity. However,
with the growing sophistication of the attacks and the complexity of
the system, the protection using traditional methods could be cost-
prohibitive. A new perspective and a new theoretical foundation are
needed to understand security from a strategic and decision-making
perspective. Game theory provides a natural framework to capture
the adversarial and defensive interactions between an attacker and
a defender. It provides a quantitative assessment of security, pre-
diction of security outcomes, and a mechanism design tool that
can enable security-by-design and reverse the attacker’s advan-
tage. This tutorial provides an overview of diverse methodologies
from game theory that includes games of incomplete information,
dynamic games, mechanism design theory to offer a modern theo-
retic underpinning of a science of cybersecurity. The tutorial will
also discuss open problems and research challenges that the CCS
community can address and contribute with an objective to build a
multidisciplinary bridge between cybersecurity, economics, game
and decision theory.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→Network security; •Mathematics of
computing; • Theory of computation → Algorithmic game
theory and mechanism design;
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1 TUTORIAL DESCRIPTION
Contemporary information and communication technology evolves
fast not only in terms of the level of sophistication but also regard-
ing its diversity. The increasing complexity, pervasiveness, and
connectivity of today’s information systems brings up new chal-
lenges to security, and the cyberspace has become a playground for
people with all levels of skills and all kinds of intention (positive
and negative). With 24/7 connectivity having become an integral
part of people’s daily life, protecting information, identities, and as-
sets has gained more importance than ever. Traditional security has
accomplished a long way toward protecting well-defined goals such
as confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity (CIA+).
Cryptography is a solid theoretic foundation for security which
relies on the secrecy of cryptographic keys. However, for attackers
who can steal full cryptographic keys as in advanced persistent
threats (APTs) or social engineering attacks, the assumption of key
secrecy fails, and they can penetrate the system. A new perspective
and a new theoretical foundation are needed to capture scenarios
where an attacker can completely compromise a system, and a de-
fender aims to protect the system without the assumption of key
secrecy.
Game-theoretic models are natural frameworks to capture the
adversarial and defensive interactions between players [9, 14, 15,
20, 21, 37, 66, 72, 77, 83]. Game theory can provide a quantitative
measure of the quality of protection with the concept of Nash equi-
libriumwhere both defender and an attacker seek optimal strategies,
and no one has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from their equi-
librium strategies despite their conflict for security objectives. The
equilibrium concept also provides a quantitative prediction of the
security outcomes of the scenario the game model captures. With
the quantitative measures of security, game theory makes security
manageable beyond the strong qualitative assurances of crypto-
graphic protections. Extending this approach to mechanism design
provides system designers freedom to shift the equilibrium and the
predicted outcomes toward ones that are favored by the defender or
the system designer via an elaborate design of the game structure.
For more than a decade now, the interest in the field has prolifer-
ated, and game- and decision theory has become a systematic and
well proven powerful theoretic underpinning of today’s security
research. Somewhat different from standard security definitions,
game- and decision theory adopts a different and more economic
viewpoint: security is not the absence of threats, but the point where
attacking a system has become more expensive than not attacking.
Starting from a game- and decision-theoretic root thus achieves
the most elegant type of self-enforcing security, by analyzing and
creating incentives to encourage actively honest behaviors rather
than preventing maliciousness. At the same time, the economic
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approach to security is also essential as it parallels the evolution
of today’s attackers. Cybercrime has grown into a full-featured
economy, maintaining black markets, supply chains, and widely
resembling an illegal counterpart of the of the official software
market. Traditional security remains an important foundation to
tackle the issue from below, but game- and decision theory offers
a top-down view by adopting the economic and strategic view of
the attackers too, and as such complements purely technological
security means. The optimum is achieved when both routes are
taken towards meeting in the middle, which is what game and
decision theory aims to achieve.
The objective of this tutorial is to introduce diverse methodolo-
gies from game theory that include mechanism design, incentive
analysis, decision-making under incomplete information, and dy-
namic games to provide solid underpinnings of a science of cy-
bersecurity. The tutorial will be organized to connect different
classes of games with different sets of security problems. For ex-
ample (1) Stackelberg and multi-layer games for proactive defense
[8, 26, 68, 70–72, 76, 80, 82], (2) network games for cyber-physical se-
curity that deals with critical infrastructure protection and informa-
tion assurance [3, 15, 21, 36, 54, 56–60], (3) dynamic games for adap-
tive defense for network security [9, 16, 17, 24, 66, 67, 78, 79, 81], (4)
mechanism design theory for economics of network security that in-
vestigates resource allocation methodologies [2, 5, 11, 13, 61, 64, 73–
75], and (5) game-theoretic analysis of cryptographic concepts,
such as perfectly confidentiality and authentication (in classical
and quantum networks) [47–50], network design and -provisioning
[30–32, 45, 46, 53] and quantitative security risk management [33–
35, 38–44, 51, 52]
From the perspective of cybersecurity, the topics of this tutorial
will cover recent applications of game theory to several emerging
topics such as cross-layer cyber-physical security [6, 21, 29, 59, 69,
77], cyber deception [14, 22, 23, 25, 66, 83], moving target defense
[18, 19, 68], critical infrastructure protection [3, 4, 12, 15, 16, 28, 37],
adversarial machine learning [26, 27, 55, 62, 63], insider threats
[1, 2], and cyber risk management [7, 10, 13, 65]. The tutorial will
also discuss open problems and research challenges that the CCS
community can address and contribute. With the objective to build
a multidisciplinary bridge between cybersecurity, economics, game
and decision theory, this tutorial will review basic concepts and
provide an overview of recent advances in the field to CCS commu-
nity with the hope to establish a community interest in the science
of security and cross-disciplinary researches.
The potential audience includes researchers from academia and
industry, including PhD and graduate students. Some background
in network security and knowledge of basic optimization and data
science is helpful but not necessary. The tutorial takes 1.5 hours.
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